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THE MOST ANCIENT LAW.
Mr. Herbert Spencer, in his "Principles of Sociology," dis-
sents sharply from many of the conclusions of Sir Henry Maine
regarding the earliest social states and legal conditions. Mr.
Spencer is not-a jurist. He has no great reverence for a lawas
a system of practical justice, he has no faith in law as a moral-
izing and improving influence, and he has little respect for law
as the output of courts and parliaments. He is never more
complacent than when he exhibits to the scorn of his readers
the imperfections of law and lawyers.
Mr. Spencer is right in much of this. Law is imperfect, nec.
essarily imperfect, and permanently imperfect. And here we
speak of law, not in any vague and general sense as a rule of
action, or rule of right reason, or formula of physics expressing
a constant relation, but as a definite system of human legislation
announced by courts and enforced by public authority. An
ideal and faultless code must proceed from an infallible legisla-
tor, like the fabled systems of Oriental sacerdotalists. The
appearance of such a body of law in the midst of our modern
societies would be nothing short of a public calamity. it could
never be fully enforced. It would not accord with the sense of
right prevalent among the people. It would be universally
condemned as visionary and utopian. If applied.it would be
essentially unjust in its operation.
Mr. Spencer's first literary venture brought out his "Social
Statics." He has lived to see the folly of many of the" con-
clusions expressed in this work, and in his riper years has
repudiated them without reserve. This book assumed to treat
of the equilibrium of a perfect society and exhibits the author
as contending for the right to ignore the state, attacking the
law of private ownership in land, opposing sanitary regulations,
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and advocating private coinage of money. The work has no
place in the system of Synthetic Philosophy; it does not follow
the scientific method but is full of metaphysical. deduction.
Now science knows nothing of so-called social statics and the
equilibrium of a perfect society. All the world moves except
what is dead. Perfection, when reached, cannot be preserved.
Retrogression is as fully in accord with the philosophy of evolu-
tion as is progress towards better things. What is fittest to sur-
vive is ever tested by environment and not by an ideal and
unyielding standard of excellence.
It is obvious that Spencer might have profited by an earnest
study of philosophic jurisprudence. Lawyers, who have been
fascinated by the Spencerian method of inquiry, are quick to
recognize that legal institutions have had their genesis and devel-
opment, and have come to their latest and most refined expres-
sion in practically the course of evolution so exhaustively illus-
trated in Mr. Spencer's books. In fact it is difficult to find in
biological or other physical science more numerous and convinc-
ing proofs of the substantial accuracy of Mr. Spencer's all-em-
bracing formula of evolutionary progress than are presented by
the stories in our books of case-law of the germs, the advances
and vicissitudes and ultimate crystallization of the now familiar
doctrines of private municipal jurisprudence. Nothing is easier
to understand than the passion for inductive study as exhibited
in the case-system of legal instruction and in the laboratory
method of psychological research. Facts first observed and
then classified and generalized are more impressive than old
theories revamped by new professors. The actual law of com-
mercial paper is well-expressed, without doubt, in the "Negotia-
ble Instruments Law," recently passed in several States; but
the student who would master the principles of negotiability
should seek his information in the adjudications which have
developed this important department of the law. It cannot be
wrong to ascribe the popularity of the inductive method of legal
instruction very largely to the influence of Mr. Spencer.
Mr. Spencer, in common with many others of the laity, has
been misled by the extravagant pretentions put forth by enthu-
siastic writers as to the nature and scope of the law. Our own
legal system has been deliberately characterized as the perfec-
tion of human reason, and jurisprudence itself exalted as the
knowledge of things divine and human. The mission of law has
been stated to be the working out of, the perfection of individual
character. If it could effect this it would leave little scope for
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the exercise of the religious and domestic virtues. The range
of individual volition is certainly small when the State pun.
ishes offenses against God and religion as well as crimes against
trade and manufacture. The conception of the state as bonus
.paterfamilias, and of statute as a panacea for social ills and the
propagandist of an evangel which promises temporal and eternal
salvation to all loyal citizens, has aroused the righteous wrath of
Mr. Spencer and his school of philosophers.
We will not go far astray if we say that the law's scope is
limited to external human conduct. The difficulties in the way
iDf proof make this necessary. The traitor who imagines the
king's death but who commits no overt act of felony stands
uncondemned by any earthly tribunal by the side of the
adulterer, who, by a lustful look, has committed sin in his
heart. Many acts which are certainly prompted by revenge or
inspired by malice often go unwhipped of justice, becafise the
law cannot look upon the heart and learn its secrets. "Be pure
in heart, or I'll flog you," said the master of Eton to his boys,
announcing a rule which no discipline could enforce. The
administration of justice must always remain imperfect in
human societies, just as the law's expression of primary rights
is at best only the aspiration and hope of weak, sinful and infirm
humanity. This is not to be regretted. For human enactments
are not to be regarded as the dreams of idealists, but as the stern
dictates of political authority enforced by the police or military
arm.
Sir Henry Maine was led to a life of scholarship through ill-
health which incapacitated him for an active career in the prac-
tice of the law. He achieved the highest eminence as a publi-
cist, jurist and man of letters. Sir Frederick Pollock, speaking
of Maine, says: "I am bold to claim immortality for my
master's work." Maine's literary style entitles him to rank
with Addison and Macaulay as a writer of ornate and elegant
English. There is nothing commonplace about him. Still it is
not difficult to understand those who confess that they are una-
ble to observe the profundity of his thoughts, who boldly
arraign him for inaccuracy, or who see in his writings nothing
but words. His generalizations are bold, his propositions sug-
gestive and often purposely uncertain, and without doubt, many
of his interpretations of Roman Law are fanciful and fallacious.
One who undertook to exaimine all his works and put down in
order the specific new propositions for which we are indebted to
Sir Henry Maine would be grievously disappointed. Some
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other writer has said, and I think with good judgment, that the
lasting value and principal charm of Sir Henry Maine, is to be
found in the marvellous suggestiveness of his style.
Maine's materials, too, were the most splendid monuments of
human genius in legislation, the most refined and polished
masterpieces in literature, and the noblest and most elevated ex-
pressions of moral sentiment that have been put forth by the
leaders of the world's thought in politics, ethics, jurisprudence
and philosophy. To elegant classic culture he added a good
knowledge of the distinct systems of the civil, the canon and the
English common law. Besides this, his official connection with
the Supreme Council of India and long residence in the East
furnished him with an opportunity to lay under tribute the
wealth of Oriental learning in jurisprudence and politics. Juris-
prudence, historical and comparative, has been introduced to
English and American students and popularized by Maine, or
at least illustrated and exhibited as a possible body of learning
awaiting fuller development hereafter. The true method of the
treatment of legal questions, namely, the historical method, has
been indicated and emphasized. The student of Maine gets a
panoramic view of law that is helpful and stimulating. By
occasional glances at unfamiliar systems such as the Brehon
Code and Hindoo jurisprudence, by a comparison of Indian,
South Slavonian and Teutonic institutions, and by regular
recurrence to the comprehensive rules of the Roman law,
he is able to note the methods of legal evolution and dis.
cern the forces which have been making for change during
the progess of centuries and millenniums. Nor is the advan-
tage to be derived from such studies wholly ornamental.
While historical studies exhibit law as a science and well-
ordered body of doctrine, and connect jurisprudence with
philosophy, ethics and even religion itself, they have the addi-
tional virtue of equipping the jurist and legislator for the duties
that confront the law reformer of to-day. The very mass of
legal literature is oppressive. No one can pretend to be
farniliar with it. It is obviously impossible to master the con-
tents of fifteen thousand volumes. The student looks earnestly
for every principle by which this mass of learning can be gener-
alized. The official reviser of statutes labors long to secure the
mastery of a legislative dialect, precise, certain, clear, uniform
and unyielding. The codifier, now busier than ever in Europe
and America, looks eagerly for rules of classification and scien-
tific arrangement which only general jurisprudence can suggest.
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The permanent value of Sir Henry Maine's work is, therefore,
not doubted by any enthusiastic student of his books.
It is obviously impossible in a brief paragraph to set forth
Mr. Spencer's fundamental principles as developed in the
"Synthetic Philosophy," or even to indicate fairly what are his
opinions and conclusions as stated in the "Principles of Soci-
ology." He is the recognized apostle of evolution and argues
for a theory that society is organic. His method is biological.
He finds that social bodies have organs which carry on functions
of sustenance, governance, reproduction and excretion. Society
is an organism like an animal. Modifications wrought in social
forms are through the influence of heredity and environment.
Changes and progressive evolution are from an indefinite,
incoherent, homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity
through continuous differentiations and integrations. Life itself
is the definite combination of heterogeneous changes both sim-
ultaneous and successive in correspondence with external co-
existence and sequences.
Mr. Spencer is not unfamiliar with Maine"s works. He has
evidently studied them faithfully. Nor is he ignorant of Eng-
lish law, or Roman law, or ecclesiastical law, or the Pentateu-
chal jurisprudence, or the law of land and personal relations
under the feudal regime. In fact one must contemplate with
admiration and wonder the range and variety of his learning in
the field of law, politics and economics. Spencer's method is
strictly scientific, and has no high place for apriori speculation
and metaphysical deduction. He is anxious to escape from
inherited prejudices and prepossessions. To learn the natural
and normal course of development he looks for man free from
the dominion of modern civilization, and he therefore studies the
untutored child of nature. The primitive man is of much inter-
est to Mr. Spencer. He finds this primitive man among the
most degraded savages at the uttermost ends of the earth and in
the isles of the sea, among the Veddahs of Ceylon, the Anda-
manese, the Tasmanians, the Aleutian Islanders, the Bushmen
of Africa, the Botocudos of Brazil, the native Australians, the
North American redmen, and the Yakuts of Siberia. Spencer's
studies are more anthropological than juristic. In absolute
chronology he does not take us far back from our present gen-
eration. The savage institutions which form the main staple of
his sociological work are gathered from the accounts of travel-
lers mostly his own contemporaries. Many of these, not except-
ing some missionaries, are notorious liars, and have brought
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back stories of the uncouth and the startling in' order to interest
their readers, and accounts of savage violence and atrocity in
order to attract attention to their courage and resourcefulness,
or increase their stipend from the subventions of philanthropic
and religious societies. Human palxontology is as instructive
to the sociologist as the psychology of the child-minded is to the
professional pedagogist. The suggestion of religious theorists
that savages of our day are degenerate and degraded specimens
of races once civilized Mr. Spencer repudiates utterly. To the
fables that there were giants in former days Mr. Spencer replies
that man is taller, stronger, healthier and more long-lived now
than ever before. This seems reasonable when we reflect that
science has taught us to expel disease and ward it off by vac-
cination and various prophylactics; that sanitary engineering has
provided for a generous flow of water, ample ventilation and
prompt removal of waste, and that mankind is housed and fed
as never before.
Nevertheless, Maine and Spencer have much in common.
Each is preeminent in intellectual leadership. Each has marked
excellences of style. Each is a student of institutions, believing
that such knowledge is more valuable than dry details of per-
sonalities or idle words of hero-worship. Moreover, each has
studied long and written much on domestic relations, parental
authority and family life, so full of influence as these have been
on legal development. Maine, indeed, while not adopting the
technical speech of evolution, has nevertheless testified his prac-
tical acceptance of that theory, by illustrating its application
to legal history. Nothing in this relation could be more impres-
sive than the chapter in "Ancient Law" which shows how
equity developed in England much as it did in Rome, and how
fiction, equity and legislation have aided in legal evolution under
the civil law and the common law alike.
In substance, these are the conclusions of Sir Henry Maine
to which Mr. Spencer objects: That the patriarchal Estate is
the earliest, and that implicit obedience to parents is a primary
fact; that ancient societies regarded themselves as descended
from one original stock, and that kinship in blood, rather than
local contiguity, is the ground of their community in political
functions; that in the infancy of- society there were definite
marital relations; that descent has always been in the male line;
that the existence of government may be postulated from the
beginning, and that political authority begins with patriarchal
rule; that, originally, property is held by the family as a cor-
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porate body, the patriarch holding his possessions in a repre-
sentative rather than a proprietary character and exercising an
unqualified dominion over his family; that perpetual tutelage of
women characterizes the infancy of society; and that we need
not take account of any stages in human progress earlier than
the pastoral or agricultural.
Spencer is not an unreasonable critic of Sir Henry Maine,
and expresses himself as "greatly valuing his works, and accept-
ing as true within limits the views he has set forth respecting
the family in its developed form, and respecting the part played
by it in the evolution of European nations" ("Principles of Soci-
ology," Vol. I, § 317). And again he says, in § 320: "Limiting
our attention to the highest societies, we have to thank Sir
Henry Maine for showing us the ways in which many of their
ideas, customs, laws and arrangements, have been derived from
those which characterized the patriarchal group."
Maine is criticized for not exploring a sufficiently wide area
of induction, and Spencer proceeds with evidence discrediting
some of Maine's conclusions, thus: The Brazilian Indian and
young Bedouin are not habitually obedient to parents; the
primitive relations of the sexes do not exhibit definite marital
relations, but polyandry is found in Thibet, and promiscuity
among the Andamanese; kinship is reckoned through females
among the Tahitians and Kongans; some social groups have no
governmental heads, as Fuegians and Eskimos; property is not
held bythe family as a corporate body in Dahomy and Congo,
where kings, according to Spencer, have unlimited authority
over the persons and property of their subjects; women are not
in perpetual tutelage among the Kare, s, the Khasias, the Sea-
Dyaks, the Nootkas, in Timbuctoo, and above the Yellala falls
on the Congo; communities which have not reached the pastoral
stage deserve study, but Spencer's observations regarding them
are hypothetical and unsatisfactory.
We may safely accept Spencer's concession that all of
Maine's generalizations which he criticizes are substantially
safe and accurate so far as concerns the legal systems of the
highest societies: and we may assume that Maine's scornful
silence, only broken by a single reference in his "Village Com-
munities," at page 17, to "the slippery testimony concerning
savages which is gathered from travellers' tales" exhibits his
indifference to the limitations of his doctrines which Mr.
Spencer ventures to make. It is not difficult to see that the
sociologist misunderstands the jurist; they are ages apart. It
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is hard to conceive of law without a law-giver, of intestate suc-
cession before sexual jealousy enables us to ascertain paternity,
of justice and mercy accorded to women and children by barba-
rians but long delayed by civilized Christians, of juristic science
in the midst of savage troglodites, scattered over wide areas
and without literature, history or traditions.
Spencer's discussion seems to be of law, but it is not. Yet
no one can be named who has given to law a wider definition
than Maine. Law is not always the creature of parliamentary
wisdom, the finished product of legislative skill. Nor need we
accept John Austin's analysis, which reveals a sanction in public
force ever present, as applicable to the juristic philosophy of
India and the Orient. Maine himself has suggested this limita-
tion of the Austinian analysis in a criticism of the English posi-
tivist school which concedes the accuracy of their views as
applied to the highly evolved legal systems of western Europe.
When does law emerge from the chaos of prehistoric and
shadowy institutions? What tests an observed institution and
proves it juristic and not merely sociological? Who ever can
answer these questions will understand both Sir Henry Maine
and Herbert Spencer, and feel thankful to them both for their
contributions to our instruction and enlightenment.
Isaac Franklin Russell.
NEw YORK CITY, May I.
